The Miners of Somerset: The Strike for Unionism, 1922-1923

“The power of capital aligned against the exploited miners was overwhelming.”

—John Brophy, 177

Today, the country is fretting as unemployment rates continue to remain high. A few years ago, the auto industry went bankrupt and the President of the United States decided to bail out the three biggest car corporations in America. In the 1920s, a similar situation occurred. Irving Bernstein writes in his book, “A number of once proud and powerful organizations met with disaster. The downfall of the United Mine Workers was most important” (85). Unfortunately, this story goes differently. The miners of Somerset, Pennsylvania, didn’t have fair wages even before the coal mining industry plummeted. By 1921, bituminous coal production was down to 407,000,000 tons, compared to the 556,000,000 tons of the year before. Production of the mines continued to drop in 1922 and the market demand grew even weaker, as nobody seemed to need bituminous coal anymore (Brophy 179-180). The purpose of this study is to inform the populace of the little known miners’ strike of 1922-1923 in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and how it changed history. First, to properly understand the topic, background information about mining, John Brophy, the president of District 2, and the how the condition of the rest of the nation affected the strike must be known. Second, the miners’ strike tactics against the corporation, who had the upper hand, must be more thoroughly examined. Thirdly, and on the contrary, the actions and retaliation of the Berwind-White Mining Company are a necessity to analyze. Finally, the reason why and exactly how it ended will be thoroughly appraised. The mining industry was one of the biggest in United States history. How did this strike happen? What caused it? What did the miners want? Some background information is in order to understand what transpired.

The coal industry was not doing well; it had been beginning to plunge into the deep end in the recent years before the strike. John Brophy, the president of District 2, sent a letter appealing to the President of the United States for help. As known, a few years ago the auto industry fell into bankruptcy and the President came to their aid with federal help. Regrettably, instead of bailing the miners out and responding to John Brophy’s pleas to extend the work week, President William G. Harding gave “only the barest acknowledgement” to Brophy’s letter and “soon made it clear that no action was ever contemplated” (179-180). Brophy realized that no governmental help would be forthcoming and took matters into his own hands as he turned to the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA). “The 2,200 delegates to the February 1922, international convention at Indianapolis stood firm against wage cuts and demanded a six-hour work day and five-day week to reduce unemployment,” recalls Brophy in his writing. “They decided that…if that agreement was not reached by April 1, a general suspension of work should be ordered” (180). The miners wanted six things to happen with this agreement: collective bargaining and the right to affiliate with the union, fair wages, accurate weighing of the coal they mined, fair pay for the “dead work”, a system where the miners were fairly represented and disputes and grievances could be settled in a peaceful manner, but “above all, they struck to assure their rights as free Americans…to put an end to the absolute and feudal control of these coal operators” (Primary Sources). After all, according to the United States Census of 1920, miners, on average, got paid roughly 54% of the value that their products are actually worth. Disappointingly, “these reforms won widespread support from both coal miners and delegates…but John L. Lewis [President of the UMWA] rejected these proposals” and no agreement was reached (Strike for Union). Hence, the miners declared strike and set down their mining tools. It would not be an easy fight, however. The miners were striking under all economic odds (Mountjoy). The mining company controlled the miners’ entire lives. They got their wages from the company, they lived on company owned land, and they spent their wages at a company owned store. What could the miners do to undermine the corporation and obtain the fair wages and free rights they deserved? What little wages they got all went back to the company through rent and supplies. To learn further about this strike for unionism, the miners’ tactics has to be analyzed with care and thoroughness.

With the miners practically under the complete control of the Berwind-White Mining Company, they used everything they could get their coal-streaked hands on. District 2 had three major tactics at their disposal: seek help from non-union miners, broadcast the strike and get the public on their side, and create a pact with Berwind-White through the UMWA that met all of their requirements. John Brophy “became convinced that the spread of the strike to the non-union fields on a big scale was our only salvation, and that publicity had to be used to the utmost end”. He called on the non-union miners to come on strike and prepared 20,000 throwaway cards with a strike call. He prepared an additional strike call that briefly stated the arguments against the corporation that was to be released to the press on March 31. Once prepared, they took action, trying to spread the word with these throwaway cards to the non-union miners “particularly in Somerset County”. Though some miners were arrested, it worked. The non-union miners were sufficiently rallied and “there was no stopping the spread of the strike” (180-4). The strike gained ground. The miners picketed outside of buildings and held secret meetings. The mayor of New York City sent a commission of inquiry and found that the condition of the striking miners was “worse than the conditions of the slaves prior to the Civil War” (McCollester).They invited in newspapers and had one of their own: Pick and Plow—later changed to Penn Central News. In fact, the News enjoyed its greatest circulation during the strike when the district bought 20,000 copies of the paper to blanket the entire striking area (Brophy 201). Brophy also asked for help from outside sources, such as a thousand tents from the army (Mountjoy). With such innovative tactics, it seems almost inevitable that the strikers would gain the reforms that they wanted and needed. Before jumping to hasty conclusions, though, an inspection of the Berwind-White Mining Company’s retaliation must be performed.

The Berwind-White Mining Company had several tactics that they used to block out the effects of the striker’s plan. After all, even though the miners had the element of surprise, the company had everything else. “They were in a better position to make the adjustment to the situation than the union was. They had vast funds at their disposal and could hire all the men they needed for any kind of work, no matter how sinister,” recalls Brophy (186). And sinister deeds there were. For a mere nine days after the miners declared strike, Berwind-White evicted several miners from their homes. Newspapers boldly declare the terrible news: “Men Ordered to Vacate Homes—Eviction notices received by a number of Berwind-White miners” (Mountjoy). The miners fought back and lived in tents as they were forced out of their houses. The Berwind-White Mining Company complained to judges under the interpretation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which made any effort of unionizing workers without their employers’ consent illegal. “We were forbidden to hold meetings, to pass out leaflets, to picket, to use union funds to house and feed strikers, or to do almost anything else the bosses might object to…hundreds were arrested for ‘trespassing’ on company property and other trumped-up charges,” Brophy writes. “Company guards were free to ignore the law and the rights of Americans in any way they chose. Strikers were beaten up, their homes invaded, their wives and children terrorized without any recourse. We were driven from meeting places…on the excuse that our meetings ‘might lead to violence’, or with no excuse at all” (187). They even took it so far to rape the wives of workers. No punishment was given to the guards. Unfair use of the law was exploited all over. On June 5, 1922, 60 men and 20 women were arrested for “throwing eggs and annoying the guards”. On the very same day, seventeen more miners’ wives were accused of “annoying the guards” in Windber (Mountjoy). Now that both sides’ tactics have been examined, how and why the strike ended must be inspected.

With two powerful tactics, the press versus numerous dishonest methods, going head to head, the outcome would be hard to predict. Both the UMWA and the Berwind-White Mining Company were still going strong. However, after a while, things started going awry for the strikers. First, in Penn Central News, which could have been an invaluable resource, Thomas D. Stiles, the editor, bashed the strike instead of endorsing it, lowering the strikers’ morale (Brophy 201). By the time they threw him out, it was too late. Then, on April 2, 1922, Ellis Searles, editor, wrote a letter that was published in the United Mine Workers’ Journal that stated, among other things, “Communist and reds are in Somerset County…working under the direction of a headquarters in New York…Unfortunately a few of these reds have worked their way into the membership in the United Mine Workers…If your report of dynamitings and other crimes is true, then these crimes can be traced to these red agitators.” John Brophy states that, “Coming from the international union itself, at a time when the country was still obsessed with the red scare and the bosses were using it on every hand against labor, this letter had a devastating effect on public opinion and on the morale of the strikers, laying a basis for the charge that anybody who supported the Somerset strike and its implied criticism of the Cleveland settlement was a Red” (205). However, the tides really turned when John L. Lewis, president of the UMWA, negotiated a controversial agreement that left out the non-union miners (Strike for Union). John Brophy says that he “put up a fight for the principle that no agreement be signed with an operator unless it covered all of his mines that were on strike, both in the newly organized and in the old, established fields...Instead, Lewis accepted any and all who came to his Cleveland conference” (191). These negotiations left thousands of newly organized workers stranded (Mountjoy). The contract ruined many hopes of winning the strike. Once the paper was signed, there was no going back. In fact, Brophy states that “the whole tremendous effort of 1922 was a failure, because of Lewis’s shortsightedness” (192). However, the miners of Somerset survived on the strike for another year before “succumbing to the superior wealth and power of the Berwind-White coal company and its allies” (Strike for Union). For that entire year, however, there really was no fight. The miners were just holding on—barely, at that. Having examined all of the tactics and the end, it is time to study how all of this affected the overall conclusion.

Despite how it ended, the Somerset miners’ strike of 1922 still changed history. First, we learned that the union and the coal mining industry were declining for years before the strike. Second, we learned that the miners used publicity and the non-union miners to try and win their fair share. Third, the Berwind-White Mining Company played unfairly and used the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to forbid anything the miners were doing. Finally, we learned that the entire strike, which was going well for the miners, toppled once John L. Lewis signed a controversial contract that omitted the newly initiated miners. This strike was one of the first instances where we truly saw blatant mistreatment of workers in American society that wasn’t due to race or religion. It showed America that we need to stand up to these corporations and be brave. The miners of Somerset were indeed brave. John Brophy says that “The Somerset strike was an inspiring demonstration of the heights of self-sacrifice and devotion that ordinary people can attain for a noble cause.” This was one of the noble causes. America knows now, hopefully, that we should not be taken over by capitalism. We should keep an eye on ourselves to make sure nothing gets out of hand. The miners will never be here again, but their message remains. Not much has changed overall since then. Corporation still dominates in America. And the Berwind-White Mining Company is celebrating its 126th anniversary this year (Berwind: History).

Works Cited

Bernstein, Irving. The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. Print.

"Berwind: History." Berwind: History. Berwind Corporation, 2011. Web. 20 Dec. 2012. <http://www.berwind.com/history.htm>

Brophy, John. A Miner's Life. Madison and Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin, 1964. Print.

McCollester, Charles. “Less Than Miraculous.” Nation 276.10 (2003): 21-23. Academic Search Elite. Web. 27 Nov. 2012. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=6454b203-c8ba-4ec7-87c6-05f5c55764b9%40sessionmgr104&vid=6&hid=128&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=afh&AN=9208888>

Mountjoy, Eileen. "That Magnificent Fight for Unionism." IUP.edu. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. <http://www.iup.edu/page.aspx?id=86115>.

"Primary Sources about the Windber Miners' Strike for Union in 1922-1923." IUP.edu. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. <http://www.iup.edu/page.aspx?id=86481>.

"The Windber Miners' Strike for Union in 1922-1923." IUP.edu. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. <http://www.iup.edu/page.aspx?id=86481>.

U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 1920: Mines and Quarries, 1919. General Report and Analytical Tables and Reports and Selected Industries: Pennsylvania. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991. <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1920.html>