It’s around 20 years after the end of World War II and the surrender of the Empire of Japan. Japan is an entirely new nation—vowing to never engage in war again, the country has no military and has become focused on attaining ideals of peace and democracy. Even though Japan’s not going to fight in any battles, they’re in a delicate position, participating in a more diplomatic conflict; tensions in Asia with the Vietnam War are heating up and the Japanese have to carefully balance their arrangements between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. However, despite being caught in the crossfire of a US-China struggle, Japan has a relatively steady relationship with the world as the scars of World War II heal. As a tentative trust is established, they can turn their focus on boosting their economy rather than spending all of their time and energy on diplomacy. Now, enter Eisaku Sato: Prime Minister, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, and an extremely controversial man. A leader born out of peace, not necessity, and trained as a lawyer, Prime Minister Sato was elected into office by the people of Japan in 1964 and remained there for 3 terms, retiring in 1972, just 3 years before his death. Sato became popular among the people because of his extremely successful economic policies and controversial because of his, perhaps less successful, but equally influential foreign policy strategies. In 1974, he was awarded one half of a Nobel Peace Prize, sharing the title with French-Irish human rights activist Seán MacBride. The justifications of the Committee’s decision were stated that “as Japanese Prime Minister he represented the will for peace of the Japanese people, and that he had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. In the Committee's opinion, the award to Sato would encourage all those who were working to halt the spread of nuclear arms” (Nobel). Despite this, many others contested the choice—one of pioneer manga artist Fujia Akatsuka’s iconic characters mentioned “Since Eisaku Sato won the Nobel Peace Prize, I’ve been unable to believe in anything at all” (H. Sato). Officially, a Nobel Peace Prize is awarded to “the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses” (Nobel). In the past, there have been many controversial Peace Prize recipients. People protest that the person’s actions were not enough, or counteracted by other actions. In 1973, Vietnamese politician Le Doc Tho became the only person to decline the Peace Prize, feeling that he was not deserving of a medal awarding efforts towards peace (Nobel). This study will attempt to analyze Sato’s actions both in a historical context and from a current point of view to determine whether the summation of the decisions the Prime Minister made were worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize. First, this study will evaluate the public view and opinions, both past and present, concerning Prime Minister Sato and his Prize. Then, this study will attempt to establish the change and consequences of his actions, both immediate and long term. Finally, it will place his actions in a historical context, determining why Sato made the decisions he did. Now, an analysis of the public’s view of Sato will be performed.
In order to properly determine whether or not Sato deserved the Prize, understanding who Sato is and how the public regarded him can be useful. To do this, this study will analyze several newspaper articles to discern the public’s perspective on Sato. Opinion on Sato’s competence as a leader varied wildly from one end of the spectrum to the other. Admirers credited him as a leader that was not afraid to compromise and for boosting Japan to her place as an industrial power. Critics expressed disapproval of his overly-cautious nature and accused him of “being an obedient servant of American interests” (Nobel). In Japan, Sato was initially a popular man, but slowly, his popularity ratings declined until a Japanese poll recorded only 23% of the population was in support of him. In 1971, during a ratification of a bill in Parliament, several members, stood up and demanded his resignation, focused on his policies with China (Halloran). Sato stepped out of office just eight months later. When Sato was awarded the Prize, a sensation broke out in Japan. The Tokyo press offered the Nobel Committee “the best black humor award” (Abrams). At Sato’s acceptance ceremony of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, demonstrators threw rocks and shouted “militarist Sato” and “no to war prize” (Culbert). In the past, the American view on Sato was generally favorable, citing that he “preferred to move cautiously behind the scenes” and calling him a “shrewd leader” (Krebs). The American media most likely had an encouraging view of Sato because of his obvious support of the west—bringing Asia’s only major non-communist country and third largest world economy closer to the US. The Nobel Committee saw him as the embodiment of Japan’s will for peace and an example to the rest of the world, all while acknowledging the controversy of their decision in Japan. And yet, even now, controversy surrounds the decision. Global authority on the Peace Prize Irwin Abrams calls Sato “a statesman of not very high moral standing” and begs the question, “Does a prize not reward a statesman for what in his office he should be doing anyway, keeping the peace?” (Abrams). Seeing these texts reflects and justifies the ideas projected by both the U.S. and the Nobel Committee (a portrayal of a man who carefully tread the path to a peaceful and weaponless world) and Japan (a criticism of a man who obediently follows the word of America and supported the U.S. war in Vietnam). Now that an analysis of the opinions and arguments for and against Sato has been done, a thorough examination of the change and consequences of Sato’s actions must be done so that an unbiased conclusion can be drawn.
There is a reason why the Nobel Peace Prize is such a highly respected award. It’s not enough to just want peace. An ideal laureate has to make it happen—remember, to facilitate “fraternity between nations, the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses” (Nobel). To be such a candidate, the consequences of Sato’s actions should have reflected one or more of these principles. The primary action of Prime Minister Sato that earned him a Peace Prize is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is a three-pillared treaty that emphasizes nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Nuclear). This, to the Committee, is proof of Sato’s will for peace and change—an example to all other nations of the world to follow the example of Japan to halt the spread of nuclear arms. However, Japan was not the first country to sign the NPT—actually, 91 other countries had signed the treaty before Japan did (Godsburg). In fact, Sato himself was quoted in support of going pro-nuclear in Japan, in December of 1964 saying,“If the other fellow has nuclear weapons, it is only common sense to have them oneself. The Japanese public is not ready for this, but would have to be educated” and in 1968 continued to challenge the anti-nuclear mindset in Japan with a speech entitled “How to Survive in the Nuclear Age” (Kase 57-59). Sato was not a revolutionary or a pioneer in the regard of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and his country’s signing of the NPT did not change the course of history any more than those of the 184 other countries that participated in the NPT. An analysis has been done on what the consequences of his actions were. Now, an investigation must be done on Eisaku Sato’s motives—to relate what he did to the events of his time.
Before hasty decisions are made, the actions of Eisaku Sato must be put into historical context. The mindset and current events of the time were very different than of those today. Objections to Sato’s award often stem from the mindset that he had concerning peace—the reasons that he did what he did. This study has already analyzed the actions Eisaku Sato did to earn the Nobel Peace Prize and found that he had signed the NPT. It was found that Sato was not the first to sign the NPT and that Sato was personally in support of having nuclear weapons in Japan. The NPT was an important treaty, but why did Sato sign it if he was in support of nuclearizing Japan? The answer comes in two parts. First, Japan did not want nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in Japan were, understandably, still taboo—in 1969, 74% of Japan was opposed to nuclearization (Kase 57). Although Sato was personally in favor of nuclear weapons, Japan was not. Sato responded accordingly to the opinion of Japan—perhaps because he wished to represent the people, perhaps because he caved to pressure. Sato was a politician and he wished to appear popular in the eyes of Japan. Secondly, signing the NPT was a part of a plan to appeal to the United States. The U.S. made a somewhat unofficial deal with Sato. President Nixon agreed to stop the United States’ occupation of the area of Okinawa in exchange for a sum of money and, to some degree, Sato’s continued cooperation (Sekiguchi). One of Sato’s claim to fame was getting back the small island Okinawa from the United States. Relating to his mindset, Sato was in strong support of the Vietnam War—another reason for public disapproval of the awarding of his prize.
In conclusion, the Nobel Peace Prize is a highly respected award. Although their committee habitually makes appropriate decisions, they do sometimes make mistakes—it is when this happens that the people must find these discrepancies rather than blindly accept a decision. This study is attempting to establish whether or not Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan is worthy of his Nobel Peace Prize. It will hopefully answer questions pertaining to the nature of a Nobel Peace Prize and challenge common assumptions about Prime Minister Sato and his relationship with Japan and the United States. First, this study analyzed the public opinions and arguments for and against Sato. It was discovered that the awarding of the Peace Prize to Sato in Japan was met with opposition and incredulity, even going so far as to throwing rocks at him at his acceptance ceremony in Oslo. They believed that his motives, opinions, and actions were not that of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Second, the study analyzed the change and consequences of the actions that the Nobel Committee cited Sato on and found that Sato was not the first (and was in fact the 92nd) country to sign the NPT—which definitely does not differentiate him from other world leaders. Finally, it broke down the motivations of Sato and saw that his mindset was not paralleled in the Nobel Committee’s decisions. Rather than being in support of peace, he advocated the Vietnam War and the nuclearization of Japan. Judging by his decisions and opinions (including those of supporting the Vietnam War and having nuclear weapons in Japan), Eisaku Sato is not worthy of an ideal Nobel Peace Prize. However, perhaps the Nobel Peace Prize has deviated from its original path. Sato is not the only controversial decision in the 100 years of Nobel Peace Prizes. Instead of awarding peace and fraternity, the Peace Prize has become a trinket to award the “Goodists”—the people that like to be seen as good (Stephens). Although Eisaku Sato is a good Prime Minister who facilitated the rise of Japan as an economic power, he is still very much a politician, and most definitely not an ideal Nobel laureate. But perhaps, he is an ideal candidate for what the Prize has become.
Works Cited
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